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ABSTRACT
Context-based authentication is a method for transparently validating another device’s
legitimacy to join a network based on location. Devices can pair with one another by
continuously harvesting environmental noise to generate a random key with no user involvement.
However, there are gaps in our understanding of the theoretical limitations of environmental noise
harvesting, making it difficult for researchers to build efficient algorithms for sampling
environmental noise and distilling keys from that noise. This work explores the
information-theoretic capacity of context-based authentication mechanisms to generate random
bit strings from environmental noise sources with known properties. Using only mild
assumptions about the source process’s characteristics, we demonstrate that commonly-used bit
extraction algorithms extract only about 10% of the available randomness from a source noise
process. We present an efficient algorithm to improve the quality of keys generated by
context-based methods and evaluate it on real key extraction hardware. M OONSHINE is a
randomness distiller which is more efficient at extracting bits from an environmental entropy
source than existing methods. Our techniques nearly double the quality of keys as measured by
the NIST test suite, producing keys that can be used in real-world authentication scenarios.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Context-based authentication is emerging as a solution to enable fast and convenient
device authentication. It verifies two devices’ coexistence by comparing an independently
generated random key or pin from an ambient source of randomness, such as wireless signal
strength, acoustic noise, electrical noise, etc.
A pair of devices performing context-based authentication begin by individually
harvesting noise from a shared source of randomness (Fig. 1). Each device samples the
environmental signal with an analog-to-digital converter and divides its sequence of samples into
blocks. Each block of the samples is then converted into a single bit by way of a bit extraction
technique. If the random source has a significant fraction of common-mode noise shared between
the two authenticating devices, then the bit sequences they extract are substantially similar. The
underlying assumption of context-based authentication is that only devices which are physically
near one another share enough common-mode noise to authenticate. Distant devices, which are
assumed not to be legitimate authenticators, generate significantly different bit sequences from
the contextual information that they can observe, so they cannot authenticate with a legitimate
device.
The environment around us is full of noise sources, but all noise sources ultimately have
the same problem: we need some filter or transformation to translate samples of the noise source
1
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into the keyspace elements. The question we are trying to answer here is how do we efficiently
build transformation functions that can produce high-quality keys.
As we will demonstrate, most environmental noise sources generate signals with a low
randomness density. Informally, we say that if we harvest a k-bit key from an environmental
source, that key could be represented with a shorter sequence of k − n bits. More formally, we
say that the Shannon entropy rate of a k-bit key generated from an environmental noise source is
He (X ) < HU (X ), where HU (X ) = k is the entropy rate of an iid sequence of k
uniformly-distributed Bernoulli random variables.
One possible solution to this problem would be to use the bit sequence extracted from the
environmental noise source as a seed for a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), which
would produce keys that are indistinguishable from random. Since PRNGs are deterministic, all
devices that start with the same seed would produce the same key. Although, if we assume that an
illegitimate user who wishes to gain access to a network that is secured by context-based
authentication knows how the PRNG converts seeds to keys—an assumption we must
make—then the keys produced by the PRNG can be of no higher quality than the seeds used to
generate them. Using cryptographic hash functions to randomize a low-entropy bit sequence
results in a similar problem.
In this work, we answer two open questions regarding the information theoretic properties
of context-based key generation. First, we ask what is the maximum amount of randomness we
can extract (in bits per second) from some environmental source process given only its power
spectral density? Second, we ask how can we increase the randomness density in keys generated
by context-based methods? In the existing literature, no technique can repeatedly generate shared
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Figure 1. Data pipeline for the context-based scheme VOLT K EY. M OONSHINE is applied during
the bit extraction phase.
keys from environmental noise that can pass standard tests for randomness—Table 1 shows a
summary of NIST results for many recent pieces of work that report their results. Without
generating sufficiently random keys, we cannot be sure that we are excluding unauthorized users.
To address the first problem, we develop a method for estimating the entropy rate—which
is an upper bound on the bit extraction rate—of the raw environmental noise signal. The bit
extraction rate matters because the most secure keys are long. RSA and DSA keys are between
2,048–4,096 bits in length, and the minimum length is getting longer all the time due to
improvements in computational capacity available for brute force attacks. For context-based
authentication techniques to be practical, they must be faster than manual techniques like typing
in a password. But current context-based authentication schemes are slow for two reasons. First,
the entropy rate of the environmental noise process—measured in bits per second—limits the
speed. Second, the efficiency of standard key generation algorithms that extract bits from the
chosen environmental noise processes tends to be low. Standard algorithms can extract one key
bit every 10–20 samples of the noise process.
To address the second problem, we introduce a new randomness distiller called
M OONSHINE[35]. M OONSHINE distills randomness from a long bit sequence with low-entropy
density into a shorter bit sequence with high entropy density that can be used as a secure
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cryptographic key. M OONSHINE produces keys with near-optimal entropy rate by selectively
discarding subsequences from the input. By contrast, other randomness correctors have
suboptimal performance [8].
The technical challenges of implementing a randomness distiller stem from the fact that
random numbers’ predictability is difficult to measure. There are many senses in which a bit
sequence may be predictable: its periodicity, propensity to generate a particular bit sequence
(even if that sequence’s appearance is not periodic), etc. Furthermore, once we know that a bit
sequence is predictable, it is not easy to selectively eliminate its predictable elements. Our
theoretical analysis of environmental entropy sources suggests techniques to deal with these
challenges and motivates our design of M OONSHINE.
This work introduces a novel randomness distiller in the data pipeline shown in Fig. 1
between bit extraction and key reconciliation which selectively removes bits generated by the bit
extractor to improve the quality of the final key that is generated. Our randomness distiller
introduces the new technique of discarding blocks of bits from the input sequence in a periodic
fashion. This has the effect of disrupting the periodic repetitions on the input sequence, with the
result being more random sequences that do well on the NIST benchmarks. We demonstrate that
this bit discarding technique significantly improves the overall quality of keys while adding only
a negligible processing overhead.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of M OONSHINE by evaluating it on real context-based
authentication hardware. The authors of VOLT K EY lent us prototypes that we used to evaluate
M OONSHINE. The M OONSHINE corrector improves the randomness of bit sequences generated
by VOLT K EY and considerably outperforms the Von Neumann randomness corrector, both in
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terms of the randomness of the resulting key and the amount of data retained after correction.
Keys generated by M OONSHINE can pass 14/15 NIST tests for randomness, making them
suitable for use as cryptographic and authentication keys. It is important to know the source
process’s entropy rate because that imposes a hard upper limit on the speed of key extraction. We
might choose to work with one noise process or another, depending on the entropy rate.
Generally speaking, when we are designing a context-based authentication scheme, we
know the general properties of the source process’s power spectral density. For example,
body-area networks that harvest electrical signals from the heart (H2H [25] and H2B [19]) to
generate authentication keys generally start with an analog source process that has a bandwidth of
a few Hertz. We can assume that its power spectral density will have a few strong harmonics in
the 1–10 Hz frequency band superimposed on additive white Gaussian noise. VOLT K EY, which
harvests randomness from the electric power lines, will likely have strong harmonics at multiples
of 60 Hz, tapering off at a few hundred Hertz. Starting with this information, we show how to
estimate the entropy rate of a typical realization of the source process and improve the quality of
extracted keys.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
1. We present a new method for calculating the entropy rate of a random process from its
samples or its PSD that works for any wide-sense stationary random process (§.3 & §0.7.7).
2. Using intermediate results from the previous technique, we introduce M OONSHINE, an
entropy distiller that can achieve a substantially improved pass rate of the NIST test for
randomness.
3. We preformed a comparative analysis of key quality from different bit streams with different
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bit extraction algorithms and environmental sources.
4. We build a prototype implementation of M OONSHINE that runs on real context-based
authentication hardware. We evaluate our prototype on several types of environmental noise. Our
results show that M OONSHINE is generalizable to different context based authentication
mechanisms.
Our methods make some mild assumptions about the characteristics of the environmental
source noise process. We model the source process as the sum of a band-limited deterministic
signal and additive white Gaussian noise.

CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND
Devices that use context-based security take advantage of the fact that the common
contextual information is shared only by a limited group of closely located devices. The presence
of common contextual information is evidence that the devices are located in the same place
simultaneously, which implies that they legitimately belong to the same user. The keys generated
from contextual information can establish initial trust (as a pairing key) and protect subsequent
communication (as a cryptographic key). This eliminates the need for human involvement for
making, entering, and managing a secret key, which can dramatically improve the overall
usability of systems that currently rely on passwords to protect data. In addition, the time-varying
nature of contextual information also allows devices to use a new key for each pairing attempt or
periodically update the cryptographic key, which significantly reduces the attack window for
adversarial agents.
Similar studies [19, 20, 22, 18], show that the act of calculating the amount of
randomness in an environmental signal is not straightforward. We cannot just sample the source
and create a histogram to compute the statistical entropy because the samples are not
independent. Most of the time, environmental noise contains some deterministic component,
causing samples to be correlated. This deterministic component makes the entropy computation
meaningless. Techniques exist for computing entropy rates from a signal’s power spectral density
7
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(PSD), but they are unstable for correlated random processes. Our contribution is to introduce a
stable method to calculate the entropy rate from a signal’s PSD that works on arbitrary random
processes.
An Overview of the Standard Context Based Authentication Process
This section gives a broad overview of the process devices and goes through to generate
random keys from environmental noise. We assume that there are two devices that are both
located near each other and measuring the same random environmental noise. Most
context-based authentication schemes involve three basic steps: noise harvesting, key generation,
and reconciliation.
1. Noise Harvesting: In the first step, the device gathers a sequence of samples from an
environmental noise process. This is usually done by a microcontroller with an analog-to-digital
converter. These samples are typically filtered to remove undesirable features and time
synchronized by sending messages over a public channel.
2. Bit Extraction (the focus of this paper): Raw samples gathered from the environmental
noise process are then converted by a fuzzy extractor into a sequence of bits that will be a key.
Generally, a few bit errors (1-10%) between authenticating devices are permitted in the extracted
bit sequence. The most popular bit extraction technique is to divide the sequence of raw noise
samples into bins of 10-20 samples each.
3. Key Reconciliation: After bit extraction, each device will have a sequence of bits in memory
that represents a key. Even though the devices are located nearby one another, differences in their
measurements of the raw environmental noise will have caused spurious errors in the extracted
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bit sequences. Key reconciliation is the process by which two nearby devices exchange messages
with one another over a public channel to resolve those bit differences. At the end of this step, if
both devices are honest and located in the same vicinity, they will each hold identical
authentication keys that can be used to encrypt data or validate their identities to one another.
Fuzzy Extractors Context-based authentication relies on the authenticating devices
observing nearly identical environmental noise signals to base their keys. But even two nearby
devices may read different values from their respective sensors during an event that creates noise.
If the event is closer to one device than the other, they will observe slightly different noise
patterns and generate different keys. Fuzzy extractors account for inconsistencies in observed
environmental noise by examining noise and use a mapping function, which all the devices in the
system share, to map the observed noise to a new value.
NIST Test for Randomness The NIST test for randomness is a software suite that
evaluates the quality of a random bit sequence. It consists of 15 separate tests that analyze the bit
stream bit-wise, block-wise, and superblock-wise. M OONSHINE’s goal is to modify a bit
sequence to increase the number of NIST tests that it passes. Passing more NIST tests should be
the goal of any random number generator to verify that generated keys are random. We use the
NIST tests for randomness as a benchmark for key quality.
The NIST test suite’s input is a bit sequence, typically thousands to hundreds of
thousands of bits in length. For each test in the suite, the input bit sequence is divided into
blocks, and each block is evaluated independently. The output of a typical run of the suite, shown
in Table 1, lists two crucial figures for each of the 15 tests: a p-value, and the proportion of bits,
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blocks, or superblocks that passed the test.
p is the probability that a true random number generator would have produced a less
random output than the given test input sequence. p values closer to 1 are better, and p values
closer to 0 are worse. C1 , C2 , ...C10 represent the number of p values that lie in the intervals
[0.0, 0.1), [0.1, 0.2), ..., [0.9, 1.0).
The proportion output gives the fraction of blocks that passed each test in the suite. We
want the proportion of passes to be as close to unity as possible. In general, the tests in the NIST
suite need a minimum of 1000 bits to evaluate the quality of the sequence—shorter sequences
cannot be evaluated with high confidence. Each stream of bits needs to be at least 1000 bits, or
our NIST test suite fails internally. Therefore, if enough bits exist, we divide the stream into 100
blocks of at least 1000 bits in size. The test suite divides sequences into blocks of 100 bits each
and subjects each block to the suite of 15 tests.
A Review of the Typical Set and the Asymptotic Equipartition Property
One of the most significant characteristics of cryptographic keys is that their bit sequences
be uniformly distributed—that is that each bit sequence should be equally probable. If some bit
sequences in the key are more likely than others, it would be easy for an attacker to guess the
chosen key. But sources that generate independent and uniformly distributed random numbers are
typically challenging to build. As previous work in context-based authentication has
demonstrated, most environmental noise does not yield uniformly distributed samples. How can
we generate uniformly distributed numbers from a nonuniform source?
Suppose we independently sample a nonuniform source many times in succession. The
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Figure 2. A sorted histogram of variable-length bit sequences generated from measured
environmental noise.
sequences of samples we obtain from that sampling process can be divided into a typical set and
a non-typical set. The probability that a sequence of independent samples lies in the typical set
approaches 1 for sufficiently long sequences. Furthermore, all sequences in the typical set are
almost uniformly distributed. This result is called the asymptotic equipartition property. Figure 2
shows histograms of bit sequences of different lengths, sorted from most probable to least
probable. Bit sequences do not need to be very long before they begin to exhibit this
almost-uniform characteristic.
Entropy Rate of a Noisy Bandlimited Signal
This section develops a new technique for measuring the entropy rate of a bandlimited
signal from its power spectral density (PSD). We begin with the Burg Max Entropy Theorem,
which compares a signal’s PSD and its entropy rate. But as we will see, Burg’s theorem is
intractable to compute for signals more than a few samples in length. We develop a
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computationally-tractable method for calculating the entropy rate of reasonably-sized signals
(several thousand samples long).
We could use the Shannon-Hartley Channel Capacity theorem, which relates the noisy
signal’s entropy rate to an SNR. The difficulty with this method is that it is not clear how to
interpret the SNR in situations where we are dealing only with noise. In most context-based
authentication scenarios, we want as much uncorrelated noise as possible, and we try to filter out
everything else. We would prefer to have an expression for entropy rate that is a function of the
power spectral density of the harvested randomness signal because that does not require us to
measure the SNR.
System Model
Suppose we harvest entropy from some environmental signal that is composed of a
deterministic part and a random part:

X(t) = D(t) + Z(t)

(1)

Where D(t) is an unknown bandlimited signal deterministic in time and Z(t) is additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN). X(t), D(t) and Z(t) are assumed to be continuous in time. This
model is used by many context-based authentication schemes, including VOLT K EY [17], H2H
and H2B [25, 19]. We can represent D(t) as an expansion in the basis of sinusoids:

D(t) =

N
X
k=0

ak cos(2πkf t + Θ)
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Where the ak s are expansion coefficients and Θk is the phase angle, modelled as a uniformly
distributed random variable on [−π, π].
Theorem 0.7.1. D(t) is a stationary process.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The autocorrelation function is the same for all time shifts, meaning that its value is only
dependent on the lag t1 − t2 , not on the absolute time t1 or t2 . We have verified that the ACF
depends only on time shift for functions of the same form with (a) more than two terms and (b)
various combinations of coefficients on each term. This is the criterion for stationarity.
We model the entropy source X(t) as a stochastic process that can be sampled discretely
in time, yielding a sequence {Xm }. In this paper, {Xm } is the sequence of ADC samples of the
environmental noise process.
Computing the Entropy Rate from the PSD
Our goal is to get a bound on the source process’s entropy rate {Xi }, which can be
directly computed from the process’s power spectral density. We want an inequality similar to the
Shannon-Hartley channel capacity bound but where the signal bandwidth and SNR are directly
computed from the properties of the source process’s PSD.
Assuming that the entropy source is a wide-sense stationary (WSS) stochastic process (as
we demonstrated in Theorem 0.7.1), we can compute its autocorrelation function by taking the
inverse Fourier transform of the PSD [11]: RXX (τ ) = F −1 (S(f ))1 :
1

This is called the Wiener–Khinchin theorem.
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Theorem 0.7.2. Burg’s Maximum Entropy Theorem
In general, the maximum entropy rate stochastic process {Xi } satisfying the constraints

RXX (k) = E [Xm Xm+k ] = αk , k = 0, 1, 2, ..., p

(2)

is the pth-order Gauss-Markov process of the form

Xm = −

p
X

ak Xm−k + Zm

(3)

k=1

Proof. See [4].
In other words, each new sample Xm is a linear combination of the previous p samples
plus some iid additive white Gaussian noise Zm ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). The ak s are chosen to satisfy
Equation 2. We can use the Yule-Walker equations to calculate the ak s from σ and the αk s, the
values of the autocorrelation function of the source process {Xi } [4].
Burg’s maximum entropy theorem holds without assuming that {Xm } is broad sense
stationary. However, to compute the αk s from the PSD, we need the source process D(t) to be
wide sense stationary. We can write each Xm−k as an expansion in the basis of complex
sinusoids:

Xm = −

p
N
X
X

ak bl e−i2πlf m/N + Zm

(4)

k=1 l=0

In Theorem 0.7.1, we demonstrated that the source process of interest is stationary under
some reasonable assumptions, and therefore it satisfies the conditions in Equation 2. In fact, the
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αk s from Equation 2 can be directly read from the autocorrelation function of the source process,
which is the inverse Fourier transform of the PSD.
Rényi Entropy
Definition 0.7.1. Rényi Entropy Let X be a random variable with an alphabet X and distribution
pX (x). The Rényi Entropy of X is defined as

R(X) = −log2

X

pX (x)2

x∈X

Bennett et. al. demonstrated [2] that the Rényi entropy is a lower bound on the number of
bits of private information that can be distilled after key reconciliation. More generally, Rényi
entropy is a convenient tool for estimating the uncertainty in a random variable. By Jensen’s
inequality, we have that Rényi entropy is upper bounded by the Shannon entropy:

R(X) ≤ H(X)

with equality when X ∼ U nif (X ).
Computing Rényi Entropy Rate Plugging in our model for Xm from Equation 4 into the
expression for Rényi Entropy:



R(Xm ) = − log2 E pX (x)2
"
!
#2
p
N
X
X
X
−i2πlf m
= − log2
Pr −
ak bl e N + Zm = x
x∈X

k=1 l=0

16
Where in the second step, we plug in the discrete Fourier transform representation of our
signal. We will now modify the limits on the double sum. First, we will set p = N , so that the
Markov process’s order is a complete sampling window. Second, we will drop the l = 0 term in
the DFT, assuming no DC offset, that the sample process has zero mean. This allows us to
combine the double sum into one sum that runs from 1 to N .

R(Xm ) = − log2

b −1
2X

x=0

Here, the ak =

√

"
Pr −

N
X

#2

!
ak b k e

−i2πlf m
N

+ Zm

=x

k=1

αk , the samples of the PSD of the deterministic signal. The outer sum

over x runs from 0 to 2b − 1 because we are assuming that the signal is being acquired with a
b-bit analog to digital converter.
Deterministic Signal Cases
If Deterministic Signal is Zero Suppose the deterministic component of the signal D(t)
is zero, and the only source of entropy is Zm , the additive white Gaussian noise, which we
assume is correlated among two or more context-based authenticators. For example, this would
be the case in the H2H body area network when there is no ECG signal on the skin, or in VoltKey
when there is no 120VAC power waveform. The only noise present is caused by cosmic
radiation.
This is a slightly unrealistic assumption, but it allows us to comprehend the amount of
entropy carried by the correlated random noise, whose statistical properties we know. In this
calculation, we want to find the amount of entropy carried by the AWGN, not the amount of
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shared entropy—called mutual information—common to both devices.
Theorem 0.7.3. The Rényi entropy of the samples of the source process {Xi } is lower bounded
by the Rényi entropy of the AWGN Zm . In other words, R(X) ≥ R(Z). After observing the
deterministic component D of the source process, the remaining uncertainty in X is due to Z, the
AWGN.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 0.7.4. Let Zm be a single sample of the analog source process {Xi } consisting only of
√
additive white Gaussian noise. Then its Rényi entropy is R(Zm ) ≈ log2 2σ π.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Here we assume that the analog AWGN signal will be quantized by an analog-to-digital
converter with b bits of precision. The sum over the alphabet X is over all of the 2b possible
quantizations that can be produced by a b-bit ADC. In the last approximation, we are assuming
that σ is small, and we are capturing most of the probability of Zm within the limits of the ADC’s
dynamic range.
In a typical application where we are intentionally amplifying correlated random noise
Zm , we can expect σ to be on the order of 1/10th the dynamic range of our ADC. For reasonable
values of σ, the Rényi entropy is limited to about 10–12 bits per sample.
This is a lower bound on the Shannon entropy of X(t) for two reasons. First, as discussed
in §0.7.5, R(X) ≤ H(X) for all random variables X. Second, our computations in this section
assume that the deterministic component of X(t) is zero. Adding a nonzero deterministic
component will increase the entropy per sample (for proof of this claim, see Appendix A).
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Still, the Rényi entropy rate of Zm is relatively high, even if we ignore the deterministic
component of the signal. Standard key extraction techniques used by context-based
authentication mechanisms are only able to extract one bit of entropy per ∼ 10 ADC samples: a
bit extraction rate about two orders of magnitude lower than what we would expect to be carried
by AWGN noise process alone!
If Deterministic Signal is Nonzero In the case where pth order Gauss-Markov process, it
is possible to compute the entropy rate without the Yule-Walker equations.

H(X ) = H(Xp |Xp−1 , ..., X0 )
= H(X0 , ..., Xp ) − H(X0 , ..., Xp−1 )
1
1
log2 (2πe)p+1 |Kp | − log2 (2πe)p |Kp−1 |
2
2


|Kp |
1
= log2 (2πe)
2
|Kp−1 |

=

where Kp is the autocorrelation matrix of the process {Xm }. The Kp autocorrelation
matrix is called a Toeplitz matrix. It is rank N . Its top row is the individual values of the
autocorrelation function of the source process {Xk }. Using the fact that

E[Xk Xl ] = RXX (k − l) = RXX (l − k)

for wide-sense stationary processes:

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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Equation 8 gives the entropy rate in terms of the source process’s autocorrelation
function. Unfortunately, Equation 8 presents a fairly serious problem: the above result cannot be
computed directly for large values of N because the determinant of the autocorrelation matrix
approaches zero as N increases. Computing the determinant of large matrices is a problem in
general and not a pathology that is isolated to our autocorrelation matrix. We discuss below a
method for computing the ratio |Kp |/|Kp−1 | without directly computing the determinants.
Calculating Entropy Rate without Directly Computing Determinants
The problem that we encounter when attempting to compute an entropy rate from
Equation 8 is that the columns of the autocorrelation matrix Kp are almost linearly dependent.
This makes the determinants of Kp and Kp−1 close to but not exactly zero, and the computer’s
floating point representation rounds the result of the determinant computation to zero. Our goal
here is to compute the ratio of the determinants, so we are not concerned about the fact that they
are individaully small.
Lemma 0.7.1. If R is an N × N triangular matrix, then the determinant of R is the product of its
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diagonal elements:
|R| =

N
Y

rii

i=1

|Kp | and |R| are close to zero because all of its diagonal elements are less than 1, causing
the product in Lemma 0.7.1 to approach zero for large N . To be clear, R and Kp are both
full-rank matrices.
Lemma 0.7.2. If A = Q1 R1 = Q2 R2 are two QR decompositions of full rank square matrix A,
then

Q2 = Q1 S
R2 = SR1
for some square diagonal S with entries ±1. If we require the diagonal elements of R to be
positive, then the factorization is unique.
Proof. Starting with the factorization A = Q1 R1 = Q2 R2 we can define a new matrix S in the
following way:

S = QT2 Q1 = R2 R−1
1
Since Q1 and Q2 are unitary, then S must also be unitary. Since R1 and R−1
2 are upper
triangular, then S must also be upper triangular. This means that S is a diagonal matrix with
elements ±1.
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Q1 R 1 = Q2 R 2

Q1 R1 R−1
2 = Q1 S = Q2
Now, apply the constraint that R1 and R2 have positive entries on their diagonals, which
forces S = I and R1 = R2 .

Theorem 0.7.5. The ratio |Kp |/|Kp−1 | = rpp , the lower rightmost element of R in the QR
factorization of Kp .
Proof.
p
Y

rkk = 10log

Qp

k=1 rkk

Pp

= 10

k=1

log rkk

k=1

Pp

Pp
Pp−1
10 k=1 log rkk
|Kp |
= Pp−1
= 10 k=1 log rkk − k=1 log rkk = rpp
|Kp−1 |
10 k=1 log rkk

Note that there is a unique QR factorization of Kp that has all positive diagonal elements
of R. We need R to have positive elements on its diagonal in order to be able to take their
logarithm. Using the above technique for computing the ratio |Kp |/|Kp−1 |, we can rewrite
Equation 8 by bringing the factor of 1/2 into the logarithm and assuming that the source process
consists only of uncorrelated Gaussian noise:
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√
H(X ) = log2 σ 2πe
Where we replace the ratio of determinants with the standard deviation of the source
process. The Shannon entropy differs from the Rényi entropy only by a factor of

p
e/2.

Measuring Shared Randomness
The idea that underlies context-based authentication techniques is that two devices can
build a shared key from a shared randomness source, which is not observable by third parties.
Evaluating the key generation scheme matters not just how much randomness is encoded in the
signal to begin with but how much of that randomness is common to both devices.
The challenge in doing a theoretical analysis of the amount of mutual information that we
would expect to be common to two context-based authenticators is that it tends to be situationally
dependent. Different environments, different physical configurations of devices, and other
parameters weigh heavily on the correlation between two source processes.
To compare the amount of mutual information between two environmental signals to the
amount of entropy, we collected some voltage measurements at high frequency from the power
outlets in our institution’s offices using VOLT K EY prototypes and analyzed their characteristics.
We used standard techniques from §0.7.1 to sample and time-align voltage measurements without
key extraction or reconciliation. We split each signal into blocks of 150,000 samples (about two
seconds of data) and computed each block’s mutual information and entropy.
There is an order of magnitude difference in entropy and mutual information—the amount
of entropy common to two authenticating devices—for the signal that we tested in this
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experiment. Said another way, only about 10% of the randomness measured by the VOLT K EYs is
common to both devices. The entropy that is not common to both devices cannot be used to
generate a key.
The entropy rate of the source process is about 16 bits per sample—slightly higher than
we would expect if we were gathering uncorrelated Gaussian noise. In Theorem 0.7.4, we
concluded that we would expect roughly 10–11 bits of entropy per sample.
Based on our experience working with context-based authentication methods, we think
that this order-of-magnitude-gap between entropy and mutual information is probably typical of
many noise types. However, it is not easy to be confident without conducting a more formal
analysis.
What is surprising is that conventional algorithms for extracting keys from a natural
environmental noise process only generate bits at about 1/10th the rate of the mutual information
in this experiment. We should expect the bit extraction rates to be slightly lower than the mutual
information rate to avoid errors—perhaps 1/2 or 1/3 bit per sample—but this discrepancy is
inefficient. Even with such low bit extraction rates, most context-based authentication schemes
still have to perform key reconciliation to eliminate bit errors in the shared key.
As we will see, the raw environmental signal’s entropy rate affects the performance of the
randomness distiller.
Related Work
The literature that is adjacent to our work can be roughly separated into two categories:
context-based authentication systems and cryptography.
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Context-Based Authentication This body of work includes full-system implementations
of context-based authentication systems. In general, each system includes a mechanism for
measuring environmental randomness, extracting bit sequences, and resolving bit errors in the bit
sequences to form identical keys. Many different sources of environmental randomness have
been studied. For body area networks of wearable devices, the H2H [25], H2B [19], and
others [38, 1] systems measure ECG signals (heartbeat data). Secret From Muscle [37] EMG
(produced by skeletal muscles) and skin vibration has been used to generate keys between
low-cost wearable devices and implantable medical devices. Context-based authentication
systems targeted at stationary IoT devices have used context from audio, humidity, luminosity,
visual, and vibration channels [23, 29, 27, 24, 30, 16]. ProxiMate, Amigo, Ensemble, and
others [20, 32, 15, 7, 12] extract entropy from measurements of the radio frequency spectrum.
Because the randomness density of environmental signals tends to be low, context-based
authentication systems generally pass half or less than half of the NIST tests. We have compiled
the results of the NIST tests from a subset of the context-based authentication systems in Table
12 .
Cryptography In the domain of cryptography and information theory, a lot of work has
focused on understanding the information content of signals. Key reconciliation—a suite of
techniques that context-based authentication relies heavily on—was originally developed for
exchanging information over quantum communication channels [3, 2, 21]. Fuzzy extractors [5],
fuzzy vaults [13], fuzzy commitment [14], and fPAKEs [6] are more modern cryptographic
2

Not all context-based authentication systems publish their NIST test results. The results shown in Table 1 are
all the published results that we could find.
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Jana et al. [12]
H2B [19]
H2H [25]
Xi et al. [36]
Secret from Muscle [37]
VoltKey [17]

te
d ev
plaate
w
y
m
F
R
c
l
e
py
lex
p TTempl
uenums, ums,
tro
un
mp
a
q
n
y
l
o
e
e
R
c
r
S
S
E
t
a
r
C
e p s x
t
n F
.
.
a
s R requelock umulumuluns ongesank FT on-ovverlaniverpproerial erial inear
Pas
F B C C R L R F N O U A S S L
10/15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓ ✓ ✓
8/15 ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓ ✓
✓
✓
8/15 ✓
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✓
✓
10/15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓ ✓ ✓
9/15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓ ✓
8/15 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

VOLT K EY + Von Neumann corr.
VOLT K EY + M OONSHINE

11/15
14/15

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

Table 1. NIST test results for various context-based authentication schemes (✓indicates pass).
techniques that are commonly used in key reconciliation by context-based authentication
systems. Also other authors have built techniques to create a more uniform distribution of biased
random number generators [8].

CHAPTER THREE
RANDOMNESS DISTILLATION
Once we have extracted a bit sequence from an environmental source noise process, we
need to distill its entropy to pass standard tests for randomness. Raw bit sequences extracted from
the environment often do not pass standard randomness tests (Table 1).
M OONSHINE is a randomness corrector that transforms independent identically
distributed samples from a random source to make their distribution closer to uniform. It works
by concatenating samples of the source into sequences. By the asymptotic equipartition property,
sequences of samples will be nearly uniformly distributed even if the individual samples are not.
Von Neumann’s corrector is a classical technique that aims to accomplish the same goal. We
compared the preformance of M OONSHINE to Von Neumann’s algorithm.
Von Neumann Corrector
The Von Neumann Corrector was an early technique used to normalize the histogram of
randomly generated bit sequences [33]. Its goal is to generate bit sequences in which 1 and 0 are
equally likely to occur from an input sequence of unfair coin tosses. The Von Neumann Corrector
groups the input sequence into pairs of bits, and it discards pairs in which both bits are the same
({1, 1} and {0, 0}). For pairs of bits that are not the same, The Von Neumann Corrector copies
only the first bit in the sequence to the output. It is essentially an application of a special case of
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the Asymptotic Equipartition Property, for which the sequence length is 2. The Von Neumann
corrector did not improve the NIST test pass rate when we applied it to the raw VOLT K EY bit
sequences (see Table 1) enough to use its output as a cryptographic key. We need a new
technique to improve the quality of keys generated by context-based authentication systems.
M OONSHINE is a new entropy distillation technique that converts long bit sequences with
low entropy per bit into shorter bit sequences with high entropy. M OONSHINE takes as input a bit
sequence from a random generator and groups bits into blocks k. Each block of k bits represents
an integer in the range [0, 2k − 1]. M OONSHINE then generates a histogram of all k-bit integers
obtained from the raw input sequence. The resulting histogram is divided into two categories: the
typical set, which is almost uniformly distributed, and the non-typical set, which occurs either
much more frequently or much less frequently than average. Half of the input sequences are
assumed to be part of the typical set, which is retained, and the other half of the sequences are
discarded.
After discarding the non-typical set, we can represent the remaining elements of the
typical set using k − 1 bit sequences. The new k − 1 bit indices are the output of the corrector.
Fig. 3(b) shows the histogram of the raw bits extracted from a VOLT K EY device grouped into
7-bit blocks and assigned indices in the range [0, 127]. Fig. 3(a) shows the histogram of data after
it has been corrected by M OONSHINE. For comparison, Fig. 3(c) shows a histogram of 7-bit
numbers generated by python’s random number generator.
In Fig. 4(a), we plot the number of bits remaining after correction by M OONSHINE as a
function of the sequence length. The Von Neumann corrector discards over 80% of the bits in the
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input sequence. By tuning the subsequence length, M OONSHINE’s bit usage can be adapted into
any size of data given by the user.
Our Implementation of M OONSHINE
M OONSHINE examines a binary stream, partitions that stream into bit sequences, and
creates a histogram of the partitioned bit sequences. M OONSHINE separates the extracted
sequences into two categories: typical sequences and non-typical sequences. It then discards
non-typical sequences and maps the typical sequences to new values based on those new
histograms. The key components of our algorithm are:
1. Sequences of size k get remapped into sequences of size k − 1.
2. We drop bits after each individual sequence from the bit stream. We discuss the reasons for
doing this at the end of this section.
3. Bit sequences that occur most frequently on the input stream are dropped. The remaining
sequences (the typical set) are remapped to new bit sequences.
The details of our algorithm are below.
1. Partition Bit Stream into Sequences M OONSHINE is given a bit stream, while a system is
running, generated from environmental noise as input. We first want to partition the bit stream
into subsequences of length k. If we let k = 8, we then initialize four arrays two of them are of
size 2k while the other two arrays are size 2k−1 . These arrays each have different jobs. One of the
arrays (called A) keeps track of the number of occurrences of each subsequence in the input bit
stream. A holds a histogram of integers extracted from the environmental noise source, similar to
that shown in Fig. 3. As we read bits from the input stream, we use array B to keep track of the
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order in which particular subsequences first occur. After converting a subsequence from the input
of length k to an integer and updating arrays A and B, we skip m bits in the input sequence.
2. Find Highest Occurring Half of Sequences To extract the typical set, we throw away the
most commonly occurring subsequences of bits. To do that we compare the number of
occurrences of each subsequence to all others in A. After knowing which subseqeunces are most
common, we drop the most common. If a index is found to be in the highest half we change that
index in A to be −1. We mark the same indices in B.
3. Remap Binary Sequences and Return the Changed Stream The last array, C, will be used
to hold the remappings. Now that we know which values to keep, we iterate through B and if the
value is not marked as −1 remap it to the next available integer in the C. If a number appears in
the stream a second time that hasn’t been remapped too, we throw it out. After we preform these
steps the result will be a bit extracted stream. We also skip over the same amount of bits we did
in the first step. For example, if 192 is the first number that appears in the bit stream, and when
indexed in array A the value is not −1. Whenever we see the value 192 in the bit stream, we
replace that value with its remapped equivalent that is defined in C. So, every occurrence of 192
in the input data stream will be replaced with zero. Also, we are replacing an original bit stream
of size k with a new bit stream of size k − 1. Therefore dropping the last bit.
Real Environmental Signals
Our analysis in §0.7.7 assumes that the environmental signal is a stationary process,
which is a valid assumption during periods of everyday activity. But during periods of little or no
activity, many environmental noise signals are not stationary. During inactivity, the entropy rate is
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effectively zero, causing samples of the source noise process not to be independent or identically
distributed. The result is that we get very long runs of zeros or ones in our extracted bit sequences
during periods of inactivity. We can repair the bit sequence by dropping bits from the input.
Bit dropping has the effect of shortening long runs of ones or zeros during periods of
inactivity. It can not make a non-stationary process stationary, but it can reduce the length of
non-stationary sequences, making them less influential in the overall signal’s properties.
An alternative we considered is to wait until the source noise process has a high enough
entropy rate before beginning key generation. But waiting for the environmental entropy rate to
increase above a threshold is impractical for real systems because two authenticating devices may
not agree on the exact moment when the entropy rate becomes high enough. Coordinating
between multiple devices would require additional communication, which wastes time. Another
advantage of bit dropping is that it allows keys to be generated immediately when requested by
the user rather than waiting for an acceptable entropy rate in the environmental noise.
Choosing Parameters k and m
The quality of keys generated by M OONSHINE depends heavily on our parameters in
Algorithm 1. The relationship between parameter values and key quality is generally
monotonic—higher parameter values usually produce better keys. Larger values of k and m
cause M OONSHINE to analyze the input datastream in longer blocks, reducing the similarity of
nearby patterns. The type of environmental source (audio, voltage, etc) also can change the
relationship between parameter value and key quality.
In our implementation of M OONSHINE, an authenticator analyzes the noise source in real
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time to find the parameter values that maximize key quality and shares those parameters with the
other device that is trying to pair. Both devices then use the shared parameter values to apply
Algorithm 1, generating a shared key.
M OONSHINE uses a warmup period during which the device continuously samples the
environmental noise source, building a bit sequence histogram. Once one device has collected
enough data to characterize the properties of the environmental noise—encoded by the
histogram—key generation commences. We use the histogram generated during warmup to
define mappings from input bit sequences to output bit sequences during key generation.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for M OONSHINE.
Input: A bit sequence B = {b1 , b2 , . . . , bN }
Input: Number of bits in a subsequence k
Input: Number of bits to skip between subsequences m
Output: A mapping from B → ZN/2
for j ← 1 to k do
sequences[j].f requency ← 0

// Initialization

sequences[j].value ← 0
sequences[j].order ← N U LL
/* Count the frequency of occurrences of subsequences.

for i ← 1 to N by m + k do
subseq ← {bi , bi+1 , . . . , bi+k−1 }

*/

// subseq is k-bit int

sequences[subseq].f requency + +
sequences[subseq].value ← subseq
if sequences[subseq].order ̸= N U LL then
sequences[subseq].order ← i/k;
sequences ← sort(sequences)
sequences ← sequences[1..N/2]
return sequences

// sort by frequency ascending
// Toss most-freq sequences

CHAPTER FOUR
EVALUATION OF MOONSHINE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of M OONSHINE with input data gathered
from various forms of context-based authentication in real-world environments. Code is available
from our GitHub repository1 . Our ZIA datasets are available from [34].
We show that M OONSHINE can generate high-quality keys from environmental noise
sources with relatively low entropy rates, making them robust against attacks. Before presenting
evaluation results, the following details the hardware and parameter settings as well as main
evaluation metrics.
Datasets
The authors of VOLT K EY [17] lent us prototypes of their hardware, which allowed us to
benchmark our prototype implementation of M OONSHINE on a realistic hardware platform. In
addition to data gathered by VOLT K EY hardware, we used the ZIA datasets published by
Fomichev et al. [10]. The dataset consists of data streams collected from seven types of
sensors—acceleration, luminosity, temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, magnetometer,
gyroscope within different contexts. It includes long sequences of synchronized data from each
sensor in an office setting, a mobile device, and a car. The authors preprocessed the data to
generate bit sequences for each setting (Office, Mobile, Car). All preprocessed bit sequences
1

https://github.com/jweezy24/Moonshine
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from the dataset have low entropy density, caused mainly by long periods of inactivity in the
underlying source noise processes. None of the bit sequences in the Office, Mobile, or Car
datasets pass the NIST tests before being processed by M OONSHINE.
We also generated a dataset of radio frequency measurements similar to those published
in [12, 20]. The hardware we used to collect the RF dataset consisted of a short stub of wire
connected directly to the analog-to-digital converter input of a microcontroller. Our RF
measurements produced relative high-quality bit sequences which passed most of the NIST tests
before being processed by M OONSHINE.
The audio dataset [31] as well as the mobile, office, and car datasets [9] came from
publicly available postings. To evaluate the audio, we created the bit stream using a commonly
used algorithm[28]. Larger datasets are evaluated on a server-class machine because of memory
restrictions on our Cortex M4. The server is also needed for NIST test evaluation, as the tests are
not compatible with the Cortex M4 board. We also evaluate our algorithm on VOLT K EY
hardware in real-time to characterize its performance on an IoT-class platform.
Evaluation metrics We evaluate the performance of M OONSHINE with various metrics.
1. NIST test pass rate: the fraction of NIST tests (discussed in §0.7.1) that pass. To generate
high-quality keys, we want the NIST test pass rate to be as high as possible.
2. Data retention rate: the fraction of input data retained in the output. We want to retain as much
information as possible after processing by M OONSHINE.
3. Diversity of datasets: We used a wide range of data from varying sources.
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Subsequence Length
In this section, we want to understand how the key quality depends on the length of
subsequences processed by M OONSHINE. According to the AEP (§0.7.2), longer subsequences
should generate better keys. In Fig. 4(b) we plot the NIST test pass rate as a function of
subsequence length for M OONSHINE-corrected data. We can achieve a near-perfect pass rate for
subsequences of at least 6 bits. The same figure also plots the NIST test pass rate of the Von
Neumann corrector for the same input data.
The tradeoff in M OONSHINE is that the corrector discards a portion of the input data
stream in the process of distilling its randomness. Fig. 4(a) shows the amount of data remaining
after randomness distillation.
Analyzing bits in longer subsequences increases the keys’ quality because the typical set
becomes more uniformly distributed on longer bit sequences. As the sequences that M OONSHINE
considers become longer, there is a starker separation between the typical set and the non-typical
set2 . For long sequences (8 or more bits), the non-typical set represents a smaller fraction of the
overall data, and more of the sequences that we actually observe are elements of the typical set.
Since M OONSHINE retains elements of the typical set and discards elements of the non-typical
set, it makes sense that we would retain more overall data if we consider longer bit sequences.
Run Time
In Fig. 4(c), we plot the run time of M OONSHINE on the VOLT K EY hardware, which uses
an ARM Cortex M4 microcontroller running at 48 MHz. M OONSHINE does not add a substantial
2

This is the trend that is visualized in Fig. 2.
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Figure 3. Evaluation of M OONSHINE on VOLT K EY: (a) Percent of bits kept after M OONSHINE.
(b) Percentage of NIST tests that pass. (c) Runtime of M OONSHINE on ARM Cortex-M4
microcontroller.
amount of time to the key generation process, even when processing long bit sequences. By
comparison, the sampling, bit extraction, and key reconciliation steps take about 20 seconds on a
pair of VOLT K EYs. This test ran on an input data stream of 200,000 bits gathered directly from
the VOLT K EY. The distilled bit sequence is in the tens of thousands of bits in length, much
longer than generally used for an authentication key. M OONSHINE can distill randomness from
the input data sequence in a reasonable amount of time. The run time should not be substantially
different when using different datasets as inputs.
Key Quality
In this section, we evaluate the quality of keys generated by M OONSHINE using the NIST
test for randomness [26]. M OONSHINE makes two parameters available to the user: bit sequence
length and bit drop length (k and m in Algorithm 1). Later evaluation will focus on the effect
those parameters have on NIST test pass rates. Fig. 5 shows the NIST test pass rate as a function
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of k and m for the office, mobile, and car datasets, which generate raw data with similar entropy
densities before being processed by M OONSHINE. Overall, M OONSHINE significantly improves
the quality of keys generated from a wide variety of environmental noise sources.
Choosing Parameters m and k The general trend is that larger parameter values tend to
generate higher-quality keys, so we would advise users of M OONSHINE to choose larger
parameter values to improve key quality. This is because larger parameter values cause
M OONSHINE to process the input data stream in longer blocks, resulting in less local similarity.
An exception to the trend is in the Car and Mobile 1 datasets, in which the most
significant parameter values cause almost all NIST tests to fail. In those two datasets, the raw
input datastream has such low randomness density already that M OONSHINE removes a
substantial portion of the input bits when it is run with large parameter values. This creates
problems because the NIST test suite needs a minimum number of bits to determine whether a bit
sequence passes each test. The output data stream fails the NIST tests when M OONSHINE
removes too many bits. We expect that keys generated from the Car and Mobile 1 datasets that
fail with large parameter values would pass nearly all NIST tests if the datasets were larger. In
practice, a system that used M OONSHINE to distill keys from low-entropy sources would gather
more data from the environmental noise source to generate a high-quality key.
We found that the office, mobile, and car datasets have low randomness density and did
not pass any NIST test before being processed by M OONSHINE because of their heavy reliance
on human activity to generate randomness. During periods of inactivity—such as a refuelling
stop during data collection in the car—result in long runs of ones or zeros in the generated bit
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Figure 4. Histograms of random numbers generated by python’s RNG compared to those
generated by M OONSHINE and VOLT K EY. (a) 7-bit sequences after removing elements of
nontypical set. (b) Raw 7-bit sequences taken from VoltKey. (c) 7-bit sequences from Python’s
RNG.
sequences, causing the NIST tests to fail. M OONSHINE performs well even on low-quality
datasets like Car and Mobile.
Fig. 4(b) shows the NIST test pass rate of M OONSHINE running on VOLT K EY as a
function of bit sequence length. The entropy rate of VOLT K EY (discussed in §.3) is much higher
than the corresponding entropy rate of the car, office, and mobile datasets. The higher entropy
rate of VOLT K EY gives us more entropy per key bit and better NIST test pass rates for the raw bit
stream. Raw bit sequences generated by VOLT K EY pass just over half the tests in the NIST suite.
M OONSHINE increases the randomness across all data sets we evaluated.
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Figure 5. Fraction of NIST tests passed after applying M OONSHINE as a function of discard
length (on the y-axis) and bit sequence length (on the x-axis).
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Figure 6. Fraction of data retained after applying M OONSHINE as a function of discard length (on
the y-axis) and bit sequence length (on the x-axis).
Discard Length
In this section, we test how the NIST test pass rate depends on the number of bits we
discard (parameterized by m in Algorithm 1) when processing the input stream. We discussed the
technique of discarding bits in the input stream in §0.8.3. Fig. 5 shows a heat map of the NIST
test pass rate as a function of discard length (y-axis) and input sequence length (x-axis). Blue
colors represent low NIST pass rates, and greens represent higher pass rates (lighter blues and
greens are better).
In Fig. 5, there is a general correlation between data retention and NIST Test pass
rate—the more data M OONSHINE removes, the more NIST tests it passes, resulting in
higher-quality keys. Furthermore, the datasets that are higher quality to begin with (such as,
VOLT K EY, Audio, and RF) retain more data after applying M OONSHINE. The lower-quality
datasets have more repetition that M OONSHINE must remove to produce a high-quality key.
Data Retention
In this section, we evaluate the fraction of input bits that remain in a key after being
processed by M OONSHINE. Fig. 6 is a color graph which represents the percentage of data
retained after M OONSHINE distills entropy from the input bit stream. Data retained is a function
of the bit sequence length k and the discard length m.
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VOLT K EY, which generates raw bit sequences with relatively high entropy rates, shows
an increasing trend of data retained as bit sequence length increases. According to the AEP,
longer sequences of samples will be more uniformly distributed and have a wider separation
between the typical set and the nontypical set. Since M OONSHINE throws away elements of the
nontypical set, there will be less information to throw away as sequence lengths get longer.
The office, mobile, and car data exhibit the same trend. However, the datasets retain less
data. This is caused by the long periods of inactivity in those datasets. Long runs of ones and
zeros on the input bit sequence represent a large percentage of the total bits extracted.
M OONSHINE eliminates those long runs of ones and zeros even when k is small.
M OONSHINE works by selectively dropping bits from the raw input bit stream, so we
expect that the output bit sequences will be shorter than the input. The bits that are dropped by
M OONSHINE are those that carry the least amount of information.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
In this section, we give some practical advice for designers of context-based
authentication mechanisms which is based on the findings in this paper. We gave two methods of
estimating the entropy rate encoded in an environmental noise signal: we calculate the
approximate Rényi entropy rate of a Gaussian noise process in Theorem 0.7.4, and we give the
more general form of a Shannon entropy rate of a noise process that includes a periodic signal
plus additive white Gaussian noise in Equation 8.
Advice #1: Filter out periodic noise from the environmental noise signal before
digitizing The goal of any context-based key generation scheme is to maximize the mutual
information rate between two authenticators. Since mutual information of two random variables
is upper-bounded by each random variable’s entropy, we must maximize entropy of the individual
source noise processes is to maximize mutual information.
Advice #2: Apply a Randomness Corrector to the Authentication Key Before
Reconciliation The raw bit sequences generated from environmental noise tend to have some
predictable structure that causes them to fail the NIST test suite (Table 1). This seems to be
caused by a low information density, or randomness per bit, in the extracted bit stream. Using
M OONSHINE, we can distill the randomness from a long bit sequence into a shorter bit sequence,
yielding a more secure key. The penalty that we pay when using a randomness corrector is that
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we must collect 2 − 3× as many bits from the environmental noise process.
Advice #3: Use a High-Entropy Environmental Noise Source if it is Available.
M OONSHINE is able to distill entropy from a high-entropy source of randomness like VOLT K EY
to generate cryptographic keys that pass the NIST test suite. We expect that other context-based
authentication systems that generate bit sequences that can pass around half of the NIST tests
would benefit significantly from M OONSHINE. M OONSHINE is also able to improve key quality
of bit sequences generated by extremely poor entropy sources like the mobile, office, and car
datasets we analyzed in §0.9.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented M OONSHINE, a technique to distill randomness from
low-entropy sources. We observed that keys generated from environmental noise sources are
predictable largely because the distribution that of the random variable that we use to generate
keys is often nonuniformly distributed. Our methods take advantage of the asymptotic
equipartition theorem, which says that long sequences of iid samples from of any random
variable will be almost uniformly distributed even if the the distribution of the individual samples
is not uniform. M OONSHINE uses the AEP to identify and remove sequences of samples that are
not uniformly distributed.
In our evaluation, we use the NIST test for randomness to evaluate the quality of keys
generated by M OONSHINE operating on input data from several publicly available datasets. Our
evaluation showed that M OONSHINE produces keys with substantially higher NIST test pass rates
than the raw bit sequences extracted from multiple different environmental sources.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY PROOFS
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Proof of Theorem 0.7.1
Starting with the simple case of N = 2:

E [Dt1 Dt2 ] = E[(a1 cos(2πf t1 + Θ) + a2 cos(4πf t1 + Θ)) ×
(9)
(a1 cos(2πf t2 + Θ) + a2 cos(4πf t2 + Θ))]


= E a21 cos(2πf t1 + Θ) cos(2πf t2 + Θ) +
E [a1 a2 cos(2πf t1 + Θ) cos(4πf t2 + Θ)] +
(10)
E [a1 a2 cos(4πf t1 + Θ) cos(2πf t2 + Θ)] +


E a22 cos(4πf t1 + Θ) cos(4πf t2 + Θ)
=

a21
E [cos(2πf (t1 − t2 ))] +
2
a22
E [cos(4πf (t1 − t2 ))]
2

(11)

The cross terms in Eq. 10 evaluate to zero because the expectation is the inner product of two
orthogonal sinusoids. The terms involving Θ in Eq. 10 evaluate to zero because we are taking the
expectation over Θ, which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [−π, π]. This leaves us with
an autocorrelation function in Eq. 11 that depends only on the difference (t1 − t2 ), which is the
criterion for stationary. This same line of reasoning applies for N > 2. This result can also be
ported to periodic signals by applying the appropriate limits. For N > 2, the same line of
reasoning applies because expectations that do not involve Θ will be taken over triples of
orthogonal sinusoids.
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Proof of Theorem 0.7.3
Lemma .2.1. Let D and Z be random variables with alphabets D and Z respectively. Let
X = D + Z over alphabet X . Then:

R(X|D) = R(Z|D)

Proof.

R(X|D) =

X

=

X

=

X

=

X

PD (d)R(X|D = d)

(12)

d∈D

PD (d)(− log

X

P (X = x|D = d)2

(13)

P (Z = x − d|D = d)2

(14)

P (Z = z ′ |D = d)2

(15)

x∈X

d∈D

PD (d)(− log

X
x∈X

d∈D

PD (d)(− log

X
z∈Z

d∈D

= R(Z|D)

(16)

After observing D, the remaining Rényi uncertainty in X is due to Z. Because conditioning
reduces uncertainty:

R(X) ≥ R(X|D) = R(Z|D) = R(Z)
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Proof of Theorem 0.7.4
Proof.
b−1
2
X

R(Xm ) = − log2

P r [bk ≤ Zm ≤ bk+1 ]2

k=−2b−1
b−1
2
X

≈ − log2

k=−2b−1

Z

+∞

≈ − log2
−∞

√
≈ log2 2σ π

1 −k2 /σ2
e
2πσ 2

1 −k2 /σ2
e
dk
2πσ 2
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